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a b s t r a c t
Limited Mobility Bias explains why positive assortative matching is not observed in the empirical
literature. Using German social security records, we estimate the correlation between worker and firm
contributions to wage equations and find that it is unambiguously positive.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Positive assortative matching (PAM) implies that high produc-
tivity workers and firms match together. This intuitively plausible
idea goes back to Roy (1951), Becker (1973) and Sattinger (1975),
but more recent contributions include Kremer (1993) and Shimer
and Smith (2000). The extent to which PAM is actually observed in
the labourmarket sheds light on themechanismswhich determine
matching, and has important policy implications, not least because
PAM is related to the degree of wage inequality.
Following the publication of Abowd et al. (1999), a number of
papers have attempted to find evidence for PAM by estimating
wage equations with worker and firm fixed effects. However,
the majority of the literature has found small or even negative
correlations between the worker and firm effects.1
There are three possible explanations for this stylised fact. First,
there are a number of highly structural models that attempt to
∗ Correspondence to: School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester,
Manchester, M13 9PL, United Kingdom. Tel.: +44 161 275 4874.
E-mail address:martyn.andrews@manchester.ac.uk (M.J. Andrews).
1 See, for example, Goux and Maurin (1999), Abowd et al. (2009), Woodcock
(2008) and Gruetter and Lalive (2009).
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is difficult to identify assortative matching from wage data only
(Bagger and Lentz, 2008; de Melo, 2008; Eeckhout and Kircher,
2011). This prompted Mendes et al. (2010) to take a more direct
approach and estimate plant-level production functions using
observable proxies for worker and firm productivities. They find
clear evidence of PAM.
Second, it is possible that two-way fixed-effectswage equations
aremisspecified because they ignore the contribution of additional
worker–firm match effects. Woodcock (2008) estimates a wage
equation which allows for such match effects, and finds that the
estimated correlation between worker and firm effects increases
from 0 to 0.185.
The third explanation is that there is a limited mobility bias
in the estimated correlation caused by estimation error. This was
noted originally byAbowd et al. (2004) butwas developed formally
by Andrews et al. (2008), who develop formulae that show that the
estimated correlation is biased downwards if there is true PAM.
Moreover, this bias is bigger the fewer the workers who move
between firms in the data, which is why it is labelled limited
mobility bias.
In this paper we show empirically that limited mobility bias
matters a lot for the estimated correlation between worker and
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German Federal Office of Labour we alter the amount of inter-
firm mobility by sampling a varying fraction of workers from
the population. We show that the estimated correlation between
worker and firm contributions to wage equations is negative
when inter-firm mobility is small, but the correlation becomes
unambiguously positive for larger samples with more inter-firm
mobility.
2. Methodology and limited mobility bias
Using linked employer–employee panel data, the literature
typically estimates
yit = µ+ z1itβ1 + z2jtβ2 + θi + ψj + εit . (1)
There are i = 1, . . . ,N workers, j = 1, . . . , J firms and
t = 1, . . . , T years. yit is wages; z1it is a vector of observable
time-varying worker covariates and z2jt is a vector of observable
time-varying firm covariates. θi and ψj are time-invariant (scalar)
unobserved heterogeneities, potentially correlated with each
other, but alsowith z1it and z2jt .Workersmaymovebetween firms;
there areM movers in total.
It is standard to assume strict exogeneity:
E(εit |1, z1i1, . . . , z1iT , z2j1, . . . , z2jT , θi, ψj) = 0.
This impliesworkers’ mobility decisions are independent of εit , but
can be a function of the unobservables θi and ψj. Because the θi
andψj are correlated with the observed covariates, random effects
methods are biased and inconsistent, and so two-way fixed-effects
methods are needed to estimate θi and ψj.2
Evidence for PAM comes from seeing whether or not the
correlation between the worker and firm components of Eq. (1) is
positive:
Corr(θi, ψj) > 0 or Corr(z1itβ1 + θi, z2jtβ2 + ψj) > 0. (2)
These two correlations each comprise a covariance and two
variances, which in turn depend on θi and ψj. As noted by Krueger
and Summers (1988), bothVar(θˆi) andVar(ψˆj) are biasedupwards;
this is because every θi and every ψj are subject to estimation
error. Andrews et al. (2008) show that Cov(θˆi, ψˆj) is also biased,
because of estimation error and because the estimates of θi andψj
are related by:
θˆi − θi = −z¯1i(βˆ1 − β1)− z¯2j(βˆ2 − β2)− (ψˆ i − ψ i)+ εi,
where ‘‘ ’’ averages a variable over t , and ‘‘ ˆ ’’ denotes an estimate
from Eq. (1). Conditional on the observed covariates, if a ψj is
over-estimated, then, on average, the corresponding θi is under-
estimated, and vice versa. Thus, if the true correlation is positive,
then the estimated correlation is biased downwards. Further,
Andrews et al. (2008) show formally, and by simulations, that the
bias can be sizeable, and reduces as the number of workers who
move between firms,M , increases.
3. Data and empirical strategy
The data come from the employment statistics register of the
German Federal Office of Labour (Beschäftigtenstatistik), which
covers all workers or trainees registered by the social insurance
system (Bender et al., 2000). Each observation has a unique
2 Standard estimation methods are not practical when the number of firms is
large. We use a2reg in Stata 11 (Ouazad, 2008), which implements the conjugate
gradient algorithm method of Abowd et al. (2002).establishment identification number.3 We select all workers in the
employment register who were employed on June 30th each year
to create a simple annual unbalanced panel, 1998–2007. To keep
sample sizes manageable, we use the two most populous states in
Western Germany (Bavaria and North Rhine Westphalia) and the
most populous in Eastern Germany (Saxony).4
The original sample sizes are approximately 88 m (Bavaria)
122 m (North-Rhine Westphalia) and 15 m (Saxony). From these
samples we select full-time workers aged 16–65 who work in
the private sector and who have non-missing values for yit , z1it
and z2jt .5 We then keep only those observations which belong to
the largest interconnected group, where a group contains all the
workers who have ever worked for any of the establishments in
that group, as well as all the establishments at which any of those
workers were employed. A second (unconnected) group is defined
only if no establishment in the first group has ever employed any
workers in the second and no establishment in the second group
has ever employed any workers in the first.6 Now the sample sizes
are approximately 46 m, 62 m and 7 m respectively.
The dependent variable is daily gross wages, which are cen-
sored at the social security contribution ceiling.7 These censored
observationswill also attenuate the estimated correlation between
worker and establishment effects towards zero.
The results of Andrews et al. (2008) suggest that Corr(θˆi, ψˆj)
should be increasing and concave in the number of movers per es-
tablishmentM/J , asymptoting towards the true correlation. When
sampling real data, one can increase M by increasing either the
proportion of workers sampled, the proportion of establishments
sampled, or the number of time periods sampled. However, there
may be genuine effects of PAM in the data that confound the rela-
tionship between the bias and the number of movers. For example,
increasing the proportion ofworkers sampled changes the size dis-
tribution of the sample of establishments, and the true correlation
between worker and establishment effects may vary with estab-
lishment size.
To get a clean experiment that allows us to increase the number
of movers, but keep the sample of establishments constant, we:
1. Take a 10% random sample of workers, and define p as the
proportion of workers sampled (p = 0.1);
2. Record the identities of all establishments which employ those
workers;
3. Holding this sample of establishments constant, increase p to
0.2, 0.3, 0.5 and 1.
We do not take a random sample of establishments and vary p,
because we would lose all inter-establishment mobility to and
from establishments outside the sample.
The p = 0.1 sample results in J = 65,032 (Bavaria), 84,564
(North-Rhine Westphalia) and 19,877 (Saxony). Table 1 sum-
marises the sample sizes andworkermovements observed in those
samples of establishments when we increase p. Thus, for example,
in Bavaria we observe an average of 29.6 worker movements per
establishment over the period 1998–2007 when all workers are
sampled.
3 Typically the literature refer to firms when discussing PAM; our data, in fact,
comprise establishments.
4 Splitting the sample means that we lose inter-establishment mobility which
occurs between states. However, the degree of inter-statemobility is extremely low.
Between 2006 and 2007 the proportion of workers remaining in the same state is
98.5% (Bavaria), 98.5% (North-Rhine Westphalia) and 97.6% (Saxony).
5 In our estimates of Eq. (1), z1it comprises tenure and a set of occupation
dummies, z2jt comprises log establishment size. We also include year dummies
which capture the effects of time, age and experience.
6 The largest group accounts for 97.8% of the remaining observations.
7 The proportion of observations in our samples which are censored in 2007 are
11.0% (Bavaria), 9.5% (North-Rhine Westphalia) and 4.7% (Saxony).
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Increasing the proportion of workers sampled in a fixed sample of establishments
increases the number of worker movements per establishment.
p Bavaria North-Rhine Westphalia Saxony
J = 65,032 J = 84,564 J = 19,877
N∗ M/J N∗ M/J N∗ M/J
0.1 1,779,562 4.2 2,309,319 4.4 436,766 3.6
0.2 3,393,479 7.0 4,409,560 7.4 820,059 5.7
0.3 5,003,038 9.8 6,519,154 10.5 1,205,597 7.9
0.5 8,214,938 15.4 10,735,633 16.6 1,977,795 12.2
1.0 16,278,473 29.6 21,270,334 31.9 3,904,445 23.1
Fig. 1. Increasing the number of movers per establishment in a fixed sample of
establishments increases Corr(θˆi, ψˆj).
4. Results
Our basic results are reported in Fig. 1. Each data point repre-
sents a single regression and the resulting Corr(θˆi, ψˆj). The propor-
tion ofworkers sampled is also indicated. The correlation increases
stronglywith p, and the patternmatches very closely the simulated
results presented in Andrews et al. (2008, Figure 1). The effect of
increasing p is very consistent across all three states, even though
one of those states (Saxony) is in Eastern Germany which has not
yet completed the transformation process.
This demonstrates that there is a positive correlation between
worker and establishment effects in German data.8 These corre-
lations are only slightly smaller than those estimated by Mendes
et al. (2010) for Portugal using data on productivity. Our results
also explain why many studies do not find such a correlation, be-
cause any given dataset could have been sampled anywhere along
the M/J-axis. Indeed, our results also explain why some studies,
with very few movers, estimate negative correlations.
The inclusion of observable characteristics in the correlation
(see Eq. (2)) does not change our conclusion because the observable
components are not subject to limited mobility bias. When we
estimate Corr(z1itβ1 + θi, z2jtβ2 + ψj), the correlation increases
by only 0.04 (Bavaria), 0.03 (North-Rhine Westphalia) and 0.02
(Saxony) when p = 1.0.
The increase in Corr(θˆi, ψˆj) is not simply a result of increasing
the sample size (worker-years). To show this, we repeat the
experiment of increasing p, but now we only keep additional
workers if they do not join or leave their establishment during
the sample period. This ensures that the number of movers
per establishment is held fixed. The result is shown in Fig. 2,
8 The estimate for p = 1.0 is still likely to be a lower bound because wages are
top-censored.Fig. 2. Increasing the number of observations per establishment, but keeping the
number of movers constant does not increase Corr(θˆi, ψˆj).
which plots the resulting proportion of workers sampled (which
is necessarily less than p) against the estimated correlation. The
(fixed) number of movers per establishment is also indicated at
each point. Because M/J is held constant there is no increase at
all in Corr(θˆi, ψˆj).
5. Conclusion
The existing empirical literature has generally failed to find
a positive correlation between worker and firm components of
wage equations, a result often seen as evidence against PAM.
We show that limited mobility bias can have a large effect
on the estimated correlation if the data include only a small
number of worker movements per firm. In our data, when the
number of movers per establishment is small (<5) the estimated
correlation is consistently negative. When the number of movers
per establishment is large (>25), the estimated correlation is
consistently positive and in the range 0.2–0.3. This strongly
suggests that, for Germany, the true correlation is positive. Given
the impact that negative assortative matching has had on the
theoretical literature since Abowd et al.’s (1999) original findings –
see Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) for a summary – we believe that
this is an important finding.
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